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Introduction 
 Prospective memory is memory for activities to be 
performed in the future. Examples include remembering to 
turn off your cell phone during a lecture, remembering to give 
your friend Patty a message, and remembering to actually 
attach an attachment to an email message. It is often 
contrasted with retrospective memory, which is the type of 
memory that psychologists typically study. Retrospective 
memory is memory for past events, such as memory of the 
plot of a movie that you saw two weeks ago, memory for the 
content of a lecture that you heard last month, and memory for 
what you had for breakfast this morning.   
 If you think about it even minimally, our lives are full of 
prospective memory demands. For example, when I get up in 
the morning, I need to remember to take my vitamins, to make 
my lunch, to pack my book bag with the things that I will 
need at school, and to stuff my gym bag with the items that I 
will need later in the day. Then, I need to remember to put all 
those items in my car and later to bring them to my office. 
During the day, I need to remember to go to class (thankfully 
I have never forgotten that), make announcements in class 
(unfortunately I have forgotten those on many occasions), and 
to attend various appointments and committee meetings 
throughout the day (regretfully, I have forgotten some of those 
too). And, at the end of the day, I may need to remember to 
meet my wife at an agreed upon time and location (I’m still 
married).   
 In an attempt to document the prevalence of prospective 
memory in everyday life, I ask my students on the first day of 
class to write down the last thing they remember forgetting. I 
then classify their memory failures as either retrospective or 
prospective memory failures. So if someone wrote that she 
was at a party recently and temporarily forgot a person’s 
name, I would classify that as a retrospective memory failure. 
By contrast, if someone wrote that he forgot to return a book 
to the library, I would classify that as a prospective memory 
failure. Regardless of whether I conduct this exercise with 
college-age students or older adults, it is always the case that 
the majority of the failures are prospective memory failures.   
 It is also the case that many of our embarrassing memory 
failures involve prospective memory. You can probably think 
of an embarrassing occasion on which you forgot to perform 
an intended action. My most embarrassing failure was 
forgetting my first department meeting as chair of the 
department. Although I was highly prepared for this meeting, 
a student called me down to the lab about 15 minutes before 
the department meeting began, and I got completely absorbed 
in solving the immediate problems there. It goes without  
 
saying that that failure of memory created an inauspicious 
start to my new leadership position!   
 Prospective memory failures can also have serious 
consequences. As of 2008, more than 50 percent of Americans 
take prescription medications on a regular basis. And as you 
might imagine, older adults take more medication than any 
other age group. Because it is not unusual for older adults to 
take three, four, or five medications regularly, forgetting to 
take one’s medication can contribute to poor health. Indeed, 
for older adults, this kind of forgetting can threaten 
independent living. 
 Despite the prevalence and importance of prospective 
memory for everyday life, there has been relatively little 
research in the field. As you can see in Figure 1, there was 
virtually no research prior to 1990—in stark contrast to the 
hundreds of thousands of studies that had been conducted on 
retrospective memory. There is steadily increasing interest in 
prospective memory, however, and empirical and theoretical 
papers on this topic are now regularly appearing in our best 
journals.   
 To give you a concrete idea of how we study prospective 
memory in the laboratory, I will describe a typical paradigm. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, we first engage participants in 
what we call an ongoing task. For example, we might tell 
them that our central interest is in having them rate words for 
the ease with which they can be imaged. So, for this task, 
participants might be presented with words one at a time in 
the center of a computer screen and then be directed to rate 
each word on a 5-point scale, where 1 indicates very difficult 
to image (e.g., truth) and 5 indicates very easy to image (e.g., 
chair). Once participants understand this task and have had 
 
Figure 1.  The growth of research on prospective memory (adapted 




some practice with it, we tell them that we have an additional 
interest in their ability to remember to perform an action in 
the future and, specifically, that if they ever see a particular 
word (e.g., the word rake) in the context of the imagery-rating 
task, they should press a designated key. We then introduce a 
delay, during which the participants are asked to perform 
several other activities. After this delay, we reintroduce the 
ongoing imagery-rating task, and we do not remind them of 
the prospective memory task. The target word rake might 
occur three or four times among 400 or so imagery-rating 
trials, and our measure of prospective remembering is the 
proportion of times out of four that participants remember to 
press the designated key when the target word rake occurs. To 
us, this is analogous to being busily engaged in the demands 
of life and yet having to remember to give your friend Patty a 
message when you see her. 
  
Theories of Prospective Memory Retrieval 
 An important question is, what is different about 
prospective memory? In the typical retrospective-memory 
task, participants might be presented with a list of words to 
learn and then at some point the experimenter puts the 
participants in what we call a retrieval mode—that is, the 
experimenter asks them to start remembering the list of words 
that was presented earlier (Tulving, 1983). The experimenter 
might present participants with some cues to help them 
remember, but the critical feature is that the experimenter asks 
them to start remembering. As can be seen in the typical 
prospective-memory paradigm described in Figure 2, a central 
difference is that in testing prospective memory the 
experimenter does not put participants in a retrieval mode 
when the target word occurs. Thus, when the word rake 
occurs in the context of the imagery-rating task, no one 
reminds them to check their memory for what they were 
supposed to do when the word rake occurs. Instead, somehow, 
participants have to switch from analyzing how easy it is to 
image words to seeing the word rake as a cue for an action. So 
a central question in the prospective-memory literature is how 
does the cognitive system accomplish remembering when 
people are not specifically trying to remember at the time? 
 There are currently two major theories that address this 
question. One theory is that we remember to perform the 
intended action through monitoring processes (Smith, 2003). 
The idea here is that when we form an intention, we initiate 
monitoring processes, which can sometimes feel like active 
and conscious monitoring and sometimes can occur 
unconsciously. Regardless of whether monitoring is conscious 
or not, the important assumptions in this theory are that 
monitoring always draws on a limited capacity of working 
memory resources and that monitoring is always necessary for 
prospective memory retrieval. Thus, if our monitoring lapses, 
we will forget.  
 My good friend and long-time colleague Mark McDaniel 
and I have proposed a very different theory, which we call the 
multiprocess theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 2007). 
Because remembering to perform actions in the future is 
central to our lives, we believe that it is adaptive to have a 
flexible system that uses a variety of mechanisms to 
accomplish prospective remembering. We believe that if we 
relied exclusively on monitoring, then prospective memory 
retrieval would be too fragile. In particular, we believe that 
there are also spontaneous retrieval processes. By spontaneous 
retrieval processes, we mean that the occurrence of an 
appropriate cue can cause an intention to pop in to mind, even 
when we are not monitoring (i.e., when no resources are 
devoted to looking for or monitoring for the target).   
 Although we have developed a couple of theories about 
exactly how spontaneous retrieval can occur, one theory is 
that during planning, people form an association between the 
target cue (e.g., the target word rake) and the intended action 
(e.g., pressing the Q key). This association is stored in long-
term memory and later, when the target cue is encountered, 
we believe that there is an associative system (very much like 
the hippocampal system described by Moscovitch, 1994; see 
McDaniel & Einstein, 2011) that delivers the intended action 
to consciousness. The idea is that if someone has formed a 
good encoding of that association and if that person fully 
processes the cue at retrieval, the intention (press the Q key) 
should pop into awareness when the individual later processes 
the target word rake.   
 
A Test of the Theories 
 The key difference between the monitoring and 
multiprocess theories is that the multiprocess theory assumes 
the existence of spontaneous retrieval processes, and a goal of 
our research has been to test for the existence of these kinds 
of retrieval processes. So how can we scientifically test 
whether a thought pops into awareness when a target word 
occurs? One might assume that you could use neuroimaging 
techniques to investigate this issue, but current neuroimaging 
methods require numerous trials and are unable to detect an 
occasional thought popping into mind. Being a cognitive 
1. Present participants with instructions and practice trials for 
an ongoing task (e.g., imagery rating). 
2. Present participants with the prospective memory 
instructions (e.g., “Press the Q key whenever you see the 
word rake in the context of the ongoing task”). 
3. A delay is introduced during which participants perform 
other activities (e.g., participants might perform other 
memory tasks and/or fill out demographics forms) 
4. Reintroduce the ongoing task (imagery rating) without 
reminding participants of the prospective memory task. 
5. The prospective memory target (rake) occurs several times 
in the ongoing task, and prospective memory performance 
is measured by the proportion of times participants 
remember to press the designated key when the target 
occurs. 
Figure 2.  A typical paradigm for studying prospective 
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psychologist, I am interested in studying mental processes 
scientifically, and the way that we do that is to infer them 
from behavior. So in order to measure whether or not a 
thought can pop into awareness, we have to creatively design 
experimental conditions that enable us to make this inference.   
 Although we have developed several methods for inferring 
spontaneous retrieval processes, the most ingenious method 
was inspired by one of my undergraduate research students, 
Ruthann Thomas, who recently finished a PhD at the 
University of Toronto and then a post-doctoral position at 
Washington University in St. Louis. She is now a professor at 
Hendrix College in Arkansas.  Her idea was to start the 
experiment with the typical first two steps of a prospective 
memory paradigm (see Figure 2) but then introduce a twist in 
the procedure. That is, she involved participants in an ongoing 
task, which was the image-rating task used in the example 
described earlier, and had them practice this task until they 
thoroughly understood it. Next, Ruthann gave participants 
prospective-memory instructions. Specifically, she told them 
that we had a secondary interest in their ability to remember 
to perform an action in the future, and that they should press 
the designated Q key whenever they saw the word rake during 
the image-rating task.   
 After being convinced that participants understood the 
instructions, she departed from the typical prospective-
memory paradigm by purposely asking participants to suspend 
their intention  to remember during an intervening speed task. 
The speed task was in actuality what we call a lexical-decision 
task. For this task, participants are presented with strings of 
letters in the middle of the computer screen and simply are 
asked to determine whether the letters form a word or not. 
Thus, if they see the letters abtel they would press the no key, 
whereas if they see the letters table, they would press the yes 
key. A critical feature of this task is that she told participants 
that our sole interest during this task was in their ability to 
perform this speed task as quickly and accurately as possible 
and to ignore all other intentions while they were performing 
it. Nonetheless, she presented the word rake during this speed 
task, as well as a control word that was matched on all 
dimensions with the word rake.   
 As you might imagine, performance on this speed task is 
nearly perfect, and the interest is in the speed of responding. 
We believe that this experimental design provides a good test 
of the theories because participants should not have been 
monitoring during the speed task (and indeed, we have 
evidence that they were not monitoring). Thus, according to 
monitoring theory, whenever the target word rake occurred, it 
should have gone by unnoticed.  That is, it should have been 
processed like any other word and had very rapid response 
times. According to the multiprocess theory, however, 
presenting the word rake to participants in the context of the 
speed task, even though participants were not monitoring, 
should cause the prospective memory to pop into awareness, 
and this should slow down participants’ speed of pressing the 
yes key to indicate that it is a word. Thus, according to the 
multiprocess theory, there should be slowing in response to 
the target word relative to matched control items. This is 
exactly what happened as participants were about 50 
milliseconds slower to respond that rake was a word (relative 
to the matched control word). Our interpretation of these 
results is that the target word rake was “loaded” in some sense 
so that whenever it occurred, it caused the intended action to 
be spontaneously retrieved and slowed down participants’ 
speed of deciding that it was a word (Einstein, McDaniel, 
Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrisette, &Breneiser, 2005; see 
also Scullin, Einstein, & McDaniel, 2009). Thus, the pattern 
of results suggests the existence of spontaneous retrieval 
processes and supports the multiprocess theory.   
Does Aging Affect Spontaneous Retrieval? 
 In our most recent research, we wondered whether normal 
aging compromises spontaneous retrieval processes.  One of 
the most common complaints of older adults is memory 
difficulties (Einstein & McDaniel, 2004), and laboratory 
research clearly shows that normal aging compromises 
performance on many retrospective memory tasks (McDaniel, 
Einstein, & Jacoby, 2008).  An intriguing pattern in the 
research, however, is that aging tends to have greater effects 
on cognitively demanding retrieval tasks (like trying to 
remember the details of a move that you saw a month ago) 
and smaller or no effects on more automatic retrieval 
processes (perhaps like spontaneous retrieval).  To examine 
the possibility that spontaneous retrieval is spared with 
normal aging, we tested your adults (college students at 
Furman University who were 17 to 23 years old) and healthy 
older adults (recruited from the Greenville community and 
between 61 and 84 years of age) in a suspended intention 
paradigm like the one described above.   Our interest was in 
whether the target word rake, when it appeared in the speed 
task, would go by unnoticed and be processed just as quickly 
as the control word or would lead to slowing (as it does in 
young adults).  As you can see in Figure 3, the exciting 
finding is that older adults showed just as much slowing to 
target words as young adults;  thus, spontaneous retrieval 
seems to be spared with normal aging.  In a new paper with 
five Furman students as coauthors (Mullet, Scullin, Hess, 
Scullin, Arnold, & Einstein, 2013), we replicated this finding 
as well as found additional evidence that spontaneous retrieval 
is preserved in normal aging.   
Improving Your Prospective Memory 
 I will close by describing a strategy that has been shown to 
be effective in improving prospective memory. The strategy is 
based on the research and theorizing of Peter Gollwitzer 
(Gollwitzer, 1999), who is very interested in how to get 
people to follow through on their intentions. He believes that 
although people often form very strong intentions, they tend 
to form very general intentions, such as “I will take my 
medication.” Because he believes that the “the road to hell is 
paved with general intentions,” he argues that people need to 
go beyond forming general intentions and instead create 
implementation intentions. These take the form of “when 
situation x arises, I will perform y.” Thus, instead of saying “I 
will take my medication,” one should form the 
implementation intention “at breakfast in the morning, I will 
take my medication.” The idea here is that it is important to 
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connect the intended action to a triggering cue. And, to the 
extent that you have formed a good encoding of this 
association, it is very likely that when having breakfast in the 
morning, the thought about taking your medication will pop 
into mind. Gollwitzer believes that forming implementation 
intentions allows us to switch from using monitoring to 
relying on spontaneous retrieval processes. The evidence is 
compelling that implementation intentions help people of all 
ages remember to perform intended actions, and I encourage 
you to conceptualize your prospective memory tasks in the 
form of implementation intentions.    
 
Conclusion  
 In closing, I want to thank the South Carolina Academy of 
Sciences and the South Carolina Research Authority for the 
Governor’s Excellence in Scientific Research Award at a 
Predominantly Undergraduate Institution and for the 
opportunity to present you with an overview of my research 
on prospective memory. I also want to thank the many 
undergraduate students who have contributed so creatively to 
my understanding of prospective memory and who have 
enriched my life. 
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Figure 3.  Lexical decision response times (in milliseconds) to
target- and matched-control items for young and older adults (from
Mullet, Scullin, Hess, Scullin, Arnold, & Einstein, 2013). 
